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concludes that the case for believing that children acquire subcategorizations and other aspects of 
syntax on the basis of semantic and contextual cues remains strong. 
Comments 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-
CIS-92-76. 
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/294 
Acquisition Of Verb Categories 
MS-CIS-92-76 
LINC LAB 237 
Mark Steedman 
University of Pennsylvania 
School of Engineering and Applied Science 
Computer and Information Science Department 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6389 
October 1992 
MARK STEEDMAN 
University of Pennsylvania 
October 15, 1992 
The paper was delivered as a commentary upon Michael Brent's 
presentation "Acquisition of Subcategorization Frames Using Ag- 
gregated Evidence from Local Syntactic Cues" to the Penn Lan- 
guage Acquisition Conference, IRCS, University of Pennsylvania, 
1992. It argues in support of using statistical techniques like 
Brent's to minimise the consequences of errors and misanalyses, 
but concludes that the case for believing that children acquire 
subcategorisations and other aspects of syntax on the basis of 
semantic and contextual cues rema,ins strong. 
The question of how children acquire lexical entries for verbs, and in partic- 
ular their subcategorisation frames is one of the central questions concerning 
the child's acquisition of syntax. Its importance is enhanced by the recent 
tendency in theories of grammar to gravitate to a lexicalist position, and the 
role of verbs as the head of their clause. How do children do it, given the 
non-determinacy and automata-theoretic complexity of the syntax itself, and 
the unsystematic presentation and error-proneness of the linguistic data that 
*Thanks to  Lila Gleitman and Jeff Siskind for reading the draft. The research was 
supported in part by NSF grant nos. IRI90-18513, IRI90-16592, and CISE IIP, CDA 
88-22719, DARPA grant no. N00014-90-J-1863, and ARO grant no. DAAL03-89-C0031. 
they apparently have to make do with? Michael Brent's paper in this volume 
shows how the statistical technique of binomial error estimation can be used 
to minimise the effect of contamination in the data available to the child 
language learner, arising either from errors in the input itself or errors in the 
child's analyses of the input sentences. The technique is demonstrated by 
applying it to the sentences of a corpus of actual adult-child conversations, 
to derive subcategorisation frames for verbs from analyses based on imper- 
fectly reliable local syntactic cues defined in terms of sequences of inflectional 
morphemes, function words and lexical NPs. As Brent points out, these two 
aspects of the work are quite independent: binomial error estimation could 
be used to minimise the influence of errors arising from imperfect analysis 
procedures of any kind at all, including those based on semantic and prosodic 
information, as well as syntactic. The present paper considers the part that 
all of these sources of information may play. 
The specific application of this technique to low-level syntactic cues, rather 
than these richer sources of information, in this and the related work in 
Brent's 1991 thesis can be argued to deliver two further important results. 
First, it demonstrates a practical technique that actually can be used to au- 
tomatically build lexicons on the basis of large volumes of text. Although 
this point is not discussed in Brent's present paper, it is worth emphasising. 
Hand-built dictionaries are inevitably very incomplete with respect to the 
exhaustive listing of subcategorisation properties that are needed for many 
computational applications. Techniques ba,sed on simplified syntactic prop- 
erties which probablistically "compile out" syntactic and semantic properties 
of what a linguist would regard as "the grammar", and working on the ba- 
sis of statistical properties of their distribution over a large corpus may well 
represent the only practicable possibility for automatically extending such 
dictionaries. Full-blown deterministic parsing of the corpora of the requisite 
size using linguistically respectable grammars and/or semantic interpreta- 
tions and deterministic parsing, is impracticably expensive computationally, 
using existing techniques, to the extent that it is possible at all. 
Second, the present study demonstrates the important fact that the infor- 
mation needed to determine verb subcategorisations actually is there in the 
distribution of these very low-level properties in input of the kind that chil- 
dren are actually exposed to. For example, one of the apparent problems for 
acquisition of subcategorisation frames on the basis of syntactic information 
alone is the systematic ambiguity in all languages between subcategorised 
arguments and nonsubcategorised adjuncts, illustrated for English by the 
following pair of sentences: 
(1) a. We put Harry on the bus 
b. We met Harry on the bus 
How can the child avoid erroneously subcategorising meet like put? Brent 
points out that it doesn't matter if they do, because it is (presumably univer- 
sally) the case that the relative frequency with which the sequence V NP PP,, 
occurs will be significantly higher for verbs like put that subcategorise for NPs 
and on PPs than for those like meet which subcategorise for NP and only 
allow P P  as an adjunct. Binomial error estima,tion is able to  distinguish the 
two distributions, and reject the childs spurious evidence from analyses sug- 
gesting that meet subcategorises for the PP. Similar results seem to  follow 
for spurious occurences of subcategorisations arising from extraction, as in 
who did you put on the bus, which might appear otherwise to suggest that 
put might subcategorise for PP alone. 
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the child language learner actu- 
ally makes use of such purely syntactic cues to learn the lexical categories of 
verbs. Here Brent is extremely cautious, and goes out of his way to acknowl- 
edge the possible involvement of prosodic and semantic cues as well. He notes 
in passing that there are a number of open questions that need answering be- 
fore we can be quite comfortable with the assumption that the child is using 
the closed-class cues. The most important is that both the function words 
themselves and the cue sequences based on them are language-specific. The 
question arises of how the child can possibly catch on to the fact that it, that 
and the are cue words, much less that that the sequence V it the suggests 
that Vis probably a ditransitive verb, while the sequence V that the suggests 
that V is probably a complement verb. It is hard to see that there is any 
alternative to knowing, besides the set of possible subcategorisation frames, 
a) the precise syntactic significance of each closed class word as NP, Spec of 
CP, etc., and b) some statistics about possible corpora, including facts such 
as that complement-taking verbs are more common than ditransitives.' 
I shall remain equally cautious in the face of such open questions, and 
certainly would not wish to claim that the child cannot be using such cues. 
However, as long as these questions remain open, it also remains unclear 
whether we have escaped what Brent identifies as the "chicken-or-egg prob- 
lem" of apparently needing to know some syntax to apply this procedure. 
This suggests that there may be some point to asking ourselves what other 
resources the child could call upon, and in particular whether the two alter- 
natives that Brent mentions, prosody and semantics, can help a child learn 
the first elements of syntax, including their first subcategorisations, in the 
face of the kind of uncertainties in the input which he identifies. 
Although Brent shows how misanalyses arising from the argument/adjunct 
ambiguity can be overcome, the consequences of some other quite similar 
sorts of ambiguity, such as that between prepositions and particles illustrated 
below, are not so easily eliminable by distribution-based methods, since verbs 
subcategorise for ambiguous items like up in both its guises:' 
(2) a. We rang up the  girl 
b. We ran up the  hill 
In the case of particles and prepositions it seems intuitively highly likely 
that prosody disambiguates the two. Lederer and Kelly 1992 have shown that 
adults can reliably identify which of the two a speaker has uttered. They have 
shown similar effects for the argument/adjunct alternation. Kelly (1992 and 
this volume) presents results which suggest that a number of further apparent 
'It is not enough to assume that the child simply looks out for verbs followed by all 
possible sequences of cue words, classifying verbs as "it-tthe verbs", "that+the verbs", etc. 
Such a classification does not determine a subcategorisation. 
'Brent suggests that spurious analyses of verbs like ring as subcategorising for PP can 
be eliminated by observing sets of subcategorisations, presumably meaning that we can 
reclassify verbs that have been assigned subcategorisations of both PP and NP+P. How- 
ever, this is a distinct (and language-specific) complication to the proposal, and appears 
likely t o  conflict with the other uses that have been proposed for such sets. The prosodic 
cues discussed below would allow this particular complication to  be eliminated from his 
account. 
ambiguities are also correlated with prosodic distinctions. It is true that none 
of these prosodic discriminators are invariably present. Nor does it seem at all 
likely that all the relevant ambiguities are marked in this way. For example, 
I know of no evidence that the V-PP sequence arising from extraction in a, 
below, differs in any prosodic repect from that in b: 
(3) a. W h o  did you  put on the bus 
b. Who did you run up the hill with  
However, where the information is marked, it may well be reliable enough 
to be used as evidence under appropriate distribution-based techniques such 
as Brent's own, especially when we recall that adult's speech to children is 
characterised by exaggeration of normal intonation contours. 
However, a word of caution is in order here. Adults speakers do not 
actually use intonation to indicate syntactic structure, but to convey the 
distinctions of discourse meaning that are variously described in terms of 
"focus", or of oppositions such as "topic/comment" , "given/newV and the 
like. While the elements that are marked in this way correlate with syntactic 
structure, this is for semantic reasons, rather than for ease of processing. 
When adults exaggerate intonation contours in speaking to children, it is 
extremely unlikely that that they are using the intonational markers in any 
very different way. It is therefore quite possible that children are using this 
information as a semantic, rather than syntactic, cue, aa part of the third 
strategy under consideration here. 
As soon as it was appreciated that even quite trivial classes of grammar can- 
not be learned by mere exposure to their stringsets, and that there appears 
to be little evidence that any more explicit guidance is provided by adults, 
it was obvious that some other source of information, "innate" in the sense 
that it is available to the child prelinguistica,lly, must guide them in acquiring 
their grammar. As has often been pointed out, the only likely candidate is 
semantic interpretation or the related conceptual repre~entation.~ However 
31n the context of modern linguistics, the suggest'ion goes hack a t  least t o  Chomsky 
1965, pp.56-59 and Miller 1967. But of course it is a ~nucli  older idea. See Pinker 1979 for 
inadequate our formal (and even informal) grasp on the child's prelinguis- 
tic conceptualisation of the conversational situation, there can be no doubt 
that it has one, for even non-linguistic animals have that much. There can 
therefore be no doubt that this cognitive apparatus, for reasons which have 
nothing to do with language as such, partitions the world into functionally 
relevant "natural kinds" of the kind investigated by Landau in this volume, 
individual entities, including events, propositions, and such grammatically 
relevant notions as actual and potential participants and properties of those 
events, as well as the attitudes and attentional focus of other conversational 
participants. Since the main thing that syntax is for is for passing concepts 
around, the belief that syntactic structure keeps as close as possible to  seman- 
tics, and that in both evolutionary and child language acquisition terms, the 
early development of syntax amounts to little more than hanging words onto 
the preexisting armatures of conceptua.1 structure is so simple and probable 
as to amount to the null hypothesis.4 
Of course, as Chomsky has repeatedly pointed out, this realisation gets 
us practically nowhere. We have such a poor grasp of the nature of the 
putative underlying conceptual structures that it is extremely difficult to 
even design experimental tests of it, (quite ampart from the other difficulties 
that arise in doing experiments with prelinguistic children) .5 Gleitman and 
others in the present volume have made considerable headway in the face of 
these difficulties, but there is a long way to go. For similar reasons to do 
with limitations on current knowledge, it does not seem to constrain syntactic 
theory in any very useful way. Right now, (and this is Chomsky's substantive 
point), the most reliable entry to the human system of language and symbolic 
cognition that we have comes from the linguists' phenomenological grasp of 
a review of some proposed mechanisms, including the important computational work of 
Anderson 1977, and see Gleitman 1990 for some cogent warnings against the assumption 
that such semantic representations have their origin solely in present perception and the 
material world in any simple sense of that term. 
4The use of the words "little more" rather than "nothing more" is important. I t  would 
not be surprising to find that some part of syntax - perhaps the observed constraints 
upon consistent orders across heads and complements - had its origin elsewhere than in 
semantics. 
5I am not saying that logicians and my fellow computer scientists do not have inter- 
esting formalisms for representing conceptual structures. In fact these systems are the 
sole source of formal theoretical devices tha.t linguists have to  draw on. But as knowledge 
representation systems, none of them as yet seem particularly close to the human one. 
the syntactic epiphenomenon, which has only just begun to look as though 
it is yielding some insight into the underlying conceptual structure. 
Nevertheless, the claim that semantics is the precursor of syntax is not 
without content, and has consequences for the question at  hand. In particu- 
lar, it immediately entails that if we are asking ourselves why children do not 
classify meet as subcategorising for NP P P  on the basis of sentences like lb ,  
we met Harry on the bus, then we are simply asking the wrong question. A 
child who learns this instance of this verb from this sentence must start from 
the knowledge that the denoted event is a meeting, and that this involves a 
transitive event concept. It simply never crosses the childs mind that meet 
might subcategorise like put, because the conceptual representation doesn't 
suggest that. 
Once again, taking this position raises more questions than it answers. We 
are only just beginning to make sense of the complex ma.pping between sur- 
face grammatical roles like subject and object, and the underlying thematic 
roles that seem to  be characteristic of the conceptual level (I am particularly 
thinking of recent work by Grimshaw 1990.) It also raises the question of 
whether the child's conceptual representation really can be used reliably in 
this fashion, which Pinker 1989 has called "semantic bootstrapping", and, if 
not, how the child can cope with its unreliability. 
$4 SYNTACTIC A N D  SEMANTIC "BOOTSTRAPPING" 
Gleitman 1990 argues very persuasively that the child must often find itself 
in a situation which is ambiguous with respective to the conceptual repre- 
sentation. To take one of her examples, a child who is being read a story 
from their picture-book about a fox and a rabbit may have insufficient in- 
formation from their understanding of the story and from a picture of the 
fox running after the rabbit to tell whether an unknown verb in an adult 
sentence of the form "The fox is VERBing the rabbit" should be associated 
with the concept of cha,sing, or the concept of fleeing. In a number of elegant 
experiments, she and Landau and their colleagues have shown that children 
who are artificially placed in this situation identify whichever conceptual rep- 
resentation is consistent with the syntactic form of the sentence. Since this 
is the only information that appears to be available to the children as a basis 
for the decision, they argue that children are capable of using a process of 
"syntactic bootstrapping" to aid them in learning the subcategorisations of 
verbs. Such a process requires the child to generalise from its existing partial 
knowledge of syntax and verbal subcategorisations, perhaps via the "linking 
rules" discussed by Pinker and his coleagues (cf. Gropen et a1 1991). 
Gleitman's proposal is in principle entirely consistent with semantic boot- 
strapping in the sense outlined here. It is actually quite likely that the child's 
conceptual representation isn't much more underspecified than being am- 
biguous as to whether this situation is an instance of transitive chasing or 
transitive fleeing, and a few other equally relevant propositions. That is, we 
can probably assume that the child knows what it is to be "read a story" that 
the story is "about the fox trying to ea.t the rabbit", aad a lot of relevant 
facts such as that "to eat something you ha,ve to ca,tch it", "rabbits don't like 
being eaten", and so on. (If they don't know stuff like this, then they may 
be in a position to learn the nouns, but probably not to learn the verbs.) In 
this case, there aren't likely to be tha.t ma.ny other possibilities, and syntac- 
tic bootstrapping may well reduce the set to one possible meaning. If so, it 
may well do so in the fa.ce of syntactic complications that are irrelevant to 
subcategorisations, such as the presence of modifiers or adjuncts. Their pres- 
ence will not lead the child to include them in crazy subcategorisations that 
will stop it from acquiring the right meaning. It already has an appropriate 
meaning, as one of a number of alternatives tha.t syntactic bootstrapping 
correctly disambiguates. 
One piece of circumstantial evidence in support of this conjecture is that 
that adults work this way too. There is increasing experimental evidence 
that the adult sentence processing mechanism deals with the huge degree of 
nondeterminism that arises from na.tural grammars by a.ppealing to  meaning, 
filtering out the miriad spurious paths that the grammar permits on the basis 
of whether they make sense, both on the basis of sentence-internal semantics, 
and of reference and extension in the context. This semantic filtering of spu- 
rious paths which would otherwise overwhelm the computational resources 
of the processor has been claimed to go on continually at every point in the 
parsing process, with very fine "grain", proba.bly more or less word by word. 
(See Steedman & Altmann 1989 and Clifton & Ferreira 1989 for references 
and arguments pro and contra this proposal, which ultimately comes from 
computer science, particularly in work by Winograd 1972.) 
Nevertheless, it may well be the case, as Gleitman suggests, that children 
are frequently much more at sea than this, a.nd may even have much larger 
sets of propositions in mind, of which most or even all of which are irrelevant 
to  the adult meaning. However, recent computational work by Siskind (1992, 
and this volume) shows that a process of intersecting such sets on successive 
encounters with the verb can be used to eliminate the spurious  meaning^.^ 
Of course, children are not adults, and neither are they mind readers, 
and a meaning that seems "appropriate" to them over a number of iterations 
of this process may not be the same as the adult's. The child's concept of 
"chasing" (we may imagine as an extension of Gleitman7s example) may be 
overspecifically restricted to an activity of attempting to catch by running. In 
this case, their own future use may be characterised by "undergeneralisation" 
- for example, they may be by unwillingness to agree that a similar scenario 
involving cars is chasing. There is of course a huge literature that has revealed 
the fine detail of this process.7 There are also instances of overgeneralisation, 
and possibly even more bizarre "complexes", revealed in non-standard lexical 
meanings. There is also evidence that children predict new lexical entries 
that they have not actually encountered, via. lexical rules such as the rule 
that generates causative verbs from certa.in a.djectives, such as cool. This 
process may on occasion give rise to non-standard lexical causatives, as in 
#It colds my hand, either because of slightly non-standard lexical rules, or 
because standard rules are applied to slightly non-standard lexical entries. 
(See Bowerman 1982 and references therein.) 
The way in which children successively modify non-standard lexical items 
to approximate the adult lexicon is the most challenging and least well- 
understood part of the process. But the undoubted fact that the processes 
of syntactic and semantic bootstrapping appea,r to iterate in this way suggests 
that together they may constitute the process by which children gain access 
'Two problems which Siskind leaves open are the problem of polysemous verbs, and 
the problem that arises when t,he set of putative meanings derived from an occurence of 
the verb are all spurious. Both of these eventualities will lead to  empty intersections. 
One simple tactic that might serve to distinguish them and thereby be used to  maintain 
a coherent lexicon would be to  respond to an empty intersection by keeping both entries, 
relying on a tactic like binomial error estimation to distinguish between true polysemous 
lexical entries and spurious ones on distributional grounds. 
'For example, Brown 1973, Bowerman 1973 and Clark 1973, and Carey 1982, the last 
including an extensive review. 
to concepts which are not immediately available to pre-linguistic sensory- 
motor cognition, and may thereby provide the force behind the explosive 
change in cognitive abilities that coincides, both in evolutionary and in 
child-developmental terms, with the appearance of l a n g ~ a g e . ~  Computa- 
tional models of the kind proposed by Brent and Siskind will continue to 
provide the only way in which theories of this process, such as syntactic, 
prosodic and semantic "bootstrapping", can be developed and evaluated. 
'See Vygotsky 1962 for for some early speculations on the nature of this process and 
its relation to Piagetian sensory-motor development, and see Oliron 1953 and Furth 1961 
for some suggestive early studies of the effects of deprivation. 
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